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A Behavioral Analysis of Legal Intentt
Ira P. Robbins* and Harvey J. Sepler**
"The intent in mind covers the thing in full; the act covers it
only in part."
Merrit v. Commonwealth
164 Va. 653, 657 (1935)

I.

Introduction

The arrangement of contingencies to control individual behavior for the good of society is fundamental to the legal system., Although all statutes and laws address these contingencies, 2 few formalized contingency analyses of legal procedures and concepts have
emerged. Because legal concepts have traditionally been defined in
cognitive terms, they are "often inherently vague in their definitional and evidentiary aspects." ' 3 This inexactitude of established
definitions of certain legal terms may be due to the subjectivity of
the issues associated with the terms.' Although a system built on
subjective foundations relies on an adversary process to balance
opposing views,5 the weaknesses inherent in the adversary process
In this article, the authors, though recognizing that the feminine gender is
equally appropriate, use the masculine gender for personal pronouns. This convention is adopted for the purposes of style and consistency.
t Copyright ' 1978 by Ira P. Robbins and Harvey J. Sepler.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Director,
Kansas Defender Project. A.B. 1970, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1973, Harvard University.
** Ph.D. Candidate, University of Kansas. A.B. 1972, University of Florida;
M.A. 1975, Western Michigan University.
1. See B. F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 430 (1953). Societies delegate the power to control individual and group behavior to an internal agency that
is responsible for maintaining certain cultural practices. In our culture, that agency
is the legal system.
2. See Dudley v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 457, 138 A.2d 53
(1958). When one is held liable for damages resulting from his noncompliance with
a promise to perform an act, the law is prescribing the delivery of punishment
contingent upon an act (promise) avoidable by another act (adherence).
3. Wexler, The Surfacing of Behavioral Jurisprudence,3 BEHAVIORISM No. 2,
at 172 (1975).
4. Id. at 175.
5. See Bazelon, Psychiatristand the Adversary Process, SCmNTIEic AMERICAN,
June, 1974, at 49.
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and the gravity of the consequences flowing from legal decisions
warrant a continuing effort to achieve increased precision in the
definition of legal terms.' Reevaluation of traditional legal notions
from a behavioral perspective offers a means of attempting such
precision. The potential impact of behavorial analysis on the structure and operation of legal scholarship has been explored only recently.7 For example, analysis of contingencies affecting the number
of insanity pleas has resulted in the raising of the "contingency
consciousness" of many legal professionals.8 However, the benefits
of applying a behavorial approach to other legal concepts have yet
to be examined.
One concept ripe for behavorial analysis is "mens rea," or the
guilty mind. Throughout its long history, numerous modifications
of this basic concept have been proposed to make it a more useful
analytical tool for resolving the complex issues with which it is
associated.' The contingency (behavorial) analysis that has proven
successful in other areas of legal scholarship 0 could help to clarify
the dispute over the meaning of terms such as mens rea. This article
explores the behavorial aspects of the concept of "guilty mind," and
the relationship of this behavorial concept to the legal concept of
intent.
6. See generally Robbins, Federalism, State Prison Reform, and Evolving
Standards of Human Decency: On Guessing, Stressing, and Redressing Constitutional Rights, 26 KAN. L. REV. 551, 567-68 (1978).
7. See, e.g., Goldiamond, Protectionof Human Subjects and Patients:A Social Contingency Analysis of Distinctions Between Research and Practice and Its
Implications, 4 BEHAVIORISM No. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Goldiamond III;
Goldiamond, Toward a Constructional Approach to Social Problems, 2
BEHAVIORISM No. 1, at 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Goldiamond f]; W. Day,
Contemporary Behaviorism and the Concept of Intention (1971) (unpublished
manuscript). See generally Robbins, The Admissibility of Social Science Evidence
in Person-OrientedLegal Adjudication, 50 IND. L. J. 493 (1975).
8. Wexler, supra note 3.
9. See generally S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs PROCESSES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 87-154 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as KADISH].
10. See ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL

310 (1974) (contingency analysis of plea bargaining); Goldiamond I, supra
note 7, at 1 (analysis of informed consent); Seyton, Merbitz, & Penneybacker,
Accountability: Cost Efficiency and Effectiveness Measures in Behavorial College
Teaching, in BEHAVIOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1973)
(analysis of educational accountability).
JUSTICE
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II.

Legal Intent

The Theory of Intent

The importance of the concept of intent in the legal system has
been well documented." According to Anglo-American common
law, behavior must have two components in order to be regarded as
criminal: actus reus (guilty or unlawful act) and mens rea (guilty
mind). 2 Liability for many crimes depends not only upon the fact
that persons have performed external acts, but also upon the fact
that they have done so with a certain state of mind, or will. Because
intent is essential to determining state of mind or will, an understanding of the nature and etiology of the concept of intent is essential to an understanding of the criminal law. 3
The history of the concept of intent reveals both religious and
philosophical influences. According to the philosophical doctrine of
free will, for example, we are regarded as "responsible creatures,"
born with the capacity to choose between right and wrong, educated
in the morals of our society, and, therefore, accountable for our
actions. 4 The exercise of man's "free will" is carried out through his
behavior. To the extent that a behavior can be attributed to the
individual, as opposed to external conditions, the behavior is described as intentional. One implication of this proposition is that
behavior that conflicts with current social standards and that is
potentially hazardous to an orderly society, such as criminal behavior, is viewed as intentional-that is, under the direct control of the
actor-unless there is direct evidence to the contrary. Religious tenets, such as the Talmudic teachings on personal responsibility, also
have helped to establish models for social control based on the concept of punishment for inappropriate behavior. 5 Thus, responsibility has become correlative to punishability.
A simple pictorial representation of the relationship between
11. See H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (review of legal and
philosophical aspects of intention).
12. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1923); KADISH, supra note 9.
13. See Bazelon, supra note 5, at 2.
14. See, e.g., PLATO, LAWS 249 (C. Bury trans. 1934); PLATO, PROTAGORAS 16

(C. Taylor trans. 1976).
15. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SABBATH § 29b (Sedar Mo'ed., Vol. I, 131:
printed by the Soncino Press, London 1938) ("Mishnah. If one extinguishes the
lamp because he is afraid of gentiles, robbers, or an evil spirit, or for the sake of
an invalid, that he should sleep, he is not culpable. If because he would spare the
lamp, the oil, or the wick, he is culpable."). Cf. Robbins, Book Review (Learning
by Redoing), 77 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1977).
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personal responsibility and the degree of socially-administered punishment for undesirable behavior can be made by constructing two
parallel continua.
RESPONSIBILITY
PUNISHMENT
The top line represents degrees of personal responsibility for a given
behavior. It directly depicts the amount of control individuals theoretically exert over the particular behavior they exhibit. The greater
the "personal control" as evidenced by a further point on the responsibility continuum, the more the behavior is said to be "free."
The determination of legal intent begins at the point where individuals are "knowingly and voluntarily" in control of their behavior.
When behavorial control is attributed to external sources, as in
cases of duress and provocation, a lesser point along the continuum
is assigned.
The determination of responsibility is a relevant, but not exclusive, legal concern. The law also must measure its right of intervention by the effects of an action. It is not difficult to speculate on the
dangers inherent in allowing a government to punish individuals on
the basis of an inferred intent. Therefore, the degree of legal accountability that individuals assume must be related to the amount
of harm they inflict.
By considering a third continuum representing varying degrees
of inflicted harm, and by balancing the quantum of harm with the
indicated degree of intentionality, the appropriate amount of punishment can be imposed." Furthermore, if numerical values indicating degree of control over behavior are placed below predetermined
points on all continua, a metaphorical analogy to the interactions
of guilt and responsibility, and thus a determination of punishment,
can be made. Since the source of control over a certain behavior is
credited to the individual, placement along the responsibility continuum changes as the numerical value increases." This is true until
16. See Table One.
17. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) (describing process for
determination of responsibility). See also Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CAL.
L. REV. 91 (1932). Of course, the determination of numerical values and their
significance is not problem-free. See note 46 infra.
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a point is reached at which a determination of personal control is
no longer necessary-in other words, where strict liability is in effect.
Because each crime has distinct dimensions of form and effect,
different continua must be drawn. For the purpose of example, however, the classifications of bodily injury are placed along the harm
continuum such that simple assault and homicide occupy the extremes of the continuum. Arbitrary numerical values are assigned
to each category to facilitate calculation. Several degrees of punishment are interspersed along that continuum to represent the two
most severe forms of criminal punishment: incarceration and execution. By totaling the values of selected points along the responsibility and harm continua, and dividing by two, it is possible to
estimate the nature and quantum of punishment appropriate for a
given crime.
Judge Learned Hand developed an analogous construct for determining liability for negligence.'" Under his formula, liability was
imposed if the quantified burden of providing adequate precautions
was less than the product of a factor representing the probability of
occurrence multiplied by a factor representing the gravity of the
potential resulting injury.'" Like the construct proposed above, the
Hand formula is merely a representation that depicts the interaction of variables; clearly, it does not offer a means of making exact
calculations of moral responsibility and punishment.20 Nevertheless, such formulae provide a method for analyzing the relationships
among the harm resulting from an act (the primary measurement
of legal accountability), the amount of personal responsibility attributed to the actor (in which determination of intention is the
critical issue), and the punishment imposed.' An understanding of
18. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F. 2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
19. Id. at 173.
20. See L. WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GoTrFREDSON, J. CALPIN, & A. GELMAN, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION, FINAL REPORT OF FEASIBILITY

STUDY 6 (in press) (United States Government Printing Office) (hereinafter cited
as WILKINS); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).

See also Hoffman & Stone-Meierhoefer, Application of Guidelines to Sentencing,
3 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 53 (1977).
21. The fact that other legal researchers have independently arrived at a similar analysis lends support to this descriptive notion. Wilkins, et al., of the Criminal
Justice Research Center, devised a set of sentencing guidelines based upon the
computation of pertinent characteristics of both the crime and the criminal. These
guidelines were devised after more than 400 criminal cases tried in Denver and
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these relationships is particularly valuable in light of the convention
22
of administering punishment to match the severity of the crime,
which, in turn, reflects the attitude that justice is a process of balancing, inter alia, harm, remuneration, and retribution.23
In the administration of justice, the question of accountability
for behavior is evident. Specifically, to what behavior does legal
accountability attach, and why? By identifying the behavorial features of acts for which the actor is not held legally accountable, it
is possible to understand better the behavorial features, or intent,
required in an act for which the actor is held legally accountable.
An individual is not legally accountable for his acts
[i]f at the time of doing what would otherwise be a punishable
act, [the actor] was unconscious, mistaken about the physical
consequences of his bodily movements or the nature or qualities
of the thing or persons affected by them, or, in some cases, if he
was subject to threats or other gross forms of coercion or was the
victim of certain types of mental disease."
Vermont were studied. By placing the dozen critical variables on a sentencing grid
and calculating the points of interaction, a preliminary model accurately predicted
the prescribed sentences delivered by judges in 80% of the one-hundred cases
sampled. See WILKINS, supra note 20, at 7.
22. See,

NATIONAL COMM. ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS,

A

PROPOSED NEW

also H. HART, supra note 10,
(1955). Biggs has traced the
modern principle of proportionality to the Hebrew Lex Talionis' ("eye for eye, tooth
for tooth") concept of punishment. He points out that this provision was a limitation on the acceptable severity of retribution. Id..at 14. See also I. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195-96 (W. Hastie trans. 1887).
23. While it may be argued that the principle of proportionality similarly
addresses the other utilitarian purposes of punishment-deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-no distinction among the four functions is necessary here.
See generally An Introduction to the Principlesof Morals and Legislation, in 1 THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 102 (final report 1971); see
at 161. Compare J. BIGGS, JR., THE GUILTY MIND 14

WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM

'24. H.

(J. Bowring ed. 1962).

supra note 11, at 28. Several psychiatrists have proposed the
adoption of a bifurcated court process, an extension of that currently in use in
California courts. By such a process, juries would decide questions of fact only,
while the judge or judicial panel would consider the criminal's mental state, or
mens rea, in deriving the appropriate punishment.
Menninger, for example, has stated that issues of intent are irrelevant to
questions of fact and, indeed, serve to hamper the efficient disposition of justice.
Rather, they are functional questions in determining the judicial disposition of
punishment after guilt has been assessed. K. Menninger, Personal Communication, (April 7, 1977). See also Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CAL. L. REV. 805 (1961).
HART,
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When an individual is said not to be legally accountable, behavior
is controlled by an external force. In those instances, the individual
does not have the capacity or opportunity to make alternative responses.2 1 While the source of the external force often is easy to
identify in cases of coercion, it becomes more difficult in cases of
provocation, duress, and insanity. However, if all behaviors are ultimately controlled by some environmental contingency, 2 the issue
of liability and excusability turns only on the availability of alternative responses in the face of compelling environmental demands.
For example, assuming that a select stimulus occasions any number
of potentially appropriate (reinforceable) responses, an individual's
"freedom" to act in one way, as compared with another, reflects the
degree to which the environment fails to determine his behavior
precisely. That is, by having alternative responses that will yield
reinforcement, "degrees of freedom" are increased.? When alternative responses are not available, and, therefore, there are fewer reinforceable behaviors, the tendency to behave in a particular manner
is more stringently determined and, in a sense, coerced . 2 This
availability of alternative responses is critical to an analysis of
intention, for there can be an intentional act, in behavioral terms,
only when several forms of behavior are available in a situation that
requires a response. 2 The existence of alternatives as both a
necessary and sufficient condition for the determination of legal intent was expressed by Justice Cardozo: "[T]here can be no intent
unless there is choice, yet by the hypothesis, the choice without
more is enough to justify the inference that the intent was deliber25. Due to the complexity of a thorough analysis of knowledge, its discussion
here will be limited. See generally Robbins, supra note 6; Robbins, supra note 7;
Robbins, supra note 15; H. Sepler, A Behavioral Analysis of Knowledge and Understanding (1975) (unpublished manuscript on file at the University of Kansas).
26. See B. F.

SKINNER,

CONTINGENCIES OF REINFORCEMENT 7 (1972). The term

"contingency" or "contingency of reinforcement" will be used herein to refer to the
interrelationships among: (1) the occasion upon which a response occurs (the stimulating environment); (2) the response itself; and (3) the reinforcing consequences.
27. See G. GLASS & J. STANLEY,

STATISTICAL METHODS IN EDUCATION AND

346 (1970). The term "degrees of freedom" here refers to the number
of integers whose value may vary once certain other integers are determined. The
more specific a stimulus configuration is, the fewer responses will be prompted in
that particular instance. Similarly, when only a select set of responses can result
in reinforcement, alternative responses are likely to be weakened or eliminated.
28. See Goldiamond I, supra note 7, at 23. See also Furlong v. German American Press Ass'n., 189 S.W. 385, 389 (Mo. 1916) (defining false imprisonment).
29. See F. IRWIN, INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATION (1971).
PSYCHOLOGY
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ate and premeditated."3 Put differently, if statements of circumstantial intent from witnesses and parties in court are considered
verbal behavior, can a court rely on them to determine the true
intention of an accused individual? 3 This question cannot be answered without initially examining the critical features that control
the form of statements of intent and the legal tests employed to
study them. 2
Knowledge of the controlling contingencies and the ability to
identify sources of control are fundamental to understanding meaningful statements of intent, and can serve as well to help identify
alternative, perhaps more reliable, indices of intent. Such knowledge is obtained either through direct exposure to the natural contingencies, or, as is more commonly the case with social behavior,
by exposure to contingency-specifying rules, which state the relationship between a form of behavior and its consequences. 3 When
an individual states what he "intends" to do, functionally he is
signalling to the listener that a particular response is likely to occur,
and that he expects the listener to respond accordingly.34 Speakers
30. B. CARDOZO, What Medicine Can Do for
OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 70, 99 (1931).

Law, in

LAw AND LrrERATURE AND

31. Cf. Robbins, supra note 7.
32. See generally B. F. SKINNER, VEmAL BEHAVIOR (1972). The conditioning of
verbal behavior has been shown to be consistent with the rules of conditioning for
nonverbal behavior. Identification and manipulation of controlling conditions
(stimulus-response-consequence contingency) is necessary to an understanding of
how behavior is learned and generalized.
33. See B. F. SKINNER, supra note 32, at 166-71. For example, when a driver
brings his automobile to a complete stop at an intersection guarded by a flashing
red traffic light, elements of the three-term contingency may be observed. While
the discrimination of the appropriate times to stop the automobile becomes more
difficult to make without the appearance of a prior stimulus (red light), there is
much research to suggest that the control exerted by the contingencies for reinforcement (i.e., delivery of the consequences for stopping, as opposed to not stopping) is the most critical element for determining the form and probability of a
specific behavior.
34. See W. Day, supra note 7, at 1. Day suggests that statements of intent
serve as indicators to the listener of the probability of a particular forthcoming
response. For example, when a speaker announces that he "intends" to do X (e.g.,
leave home by 9 a.m.), he is indicating to his verbal audience that the probability
of his doing X is strong.
The speaker may evaluate the probability of forthcoming responses in either
of two ways. When certain stimulus conditions, which have previously evoked
particular responses, are again presented, the speaker may report that those particular responses are especially likely to occur under these conditions. Such a statement of intent describes the stimulus control of the current conditions over his
responding.
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learn to state "intentions" or "purposes" either by responding to or
describing certain environmental variables that previously have
accompanied particular actions, or preparatory behavior that previously has resulted in a specific action. The acquisition of monetary
rewards following another's death, or the quelling of abusive and
provocative behavior are examples of existent reinforcement contingencies. Similarly, behavior based on its probable consequences is
"intentional" behavior that is expected to achieve a particular result.5 In other cases, statements of intention are merely descriptions
of reinforcement contingencies that resemble past conditions or contingencies. The effect on the listener may be to change his disposition to act toward the speaker. In this sense, statements of intent
are functional, and are susceptible to ulterior contingencies that
benefit the speaker in other ways.
By recognizing the conditions (contingencies) that control personal responses, and by extrapolating to similar controlling conditions, we sometimes are able to identify the conditions that generally control behavior. In this way, it is possible to state the probable
intention of an individual. These estimated behavioral relations
("reasons") are collectively identified by the term "intention, 38 and
accurate predictions or estimates of intent are made possible by
strong behavorial control and highly perceptible reinforcement contingencies. Yet the incidence of false statements of intent is high,
and courts have traditionally been skeptical of the accuracy of verbal reports. 37 This skepticism may be due to the difficulty of identifying controlling stimuli, the imprecision of attending to relevant
sources of control amidst a multiplicity of alternative behavorial
relations, and the inaccessibility of these private behavorial rela38
tions to the community.
Statements of intent also may describe the increased probability of occurrence
of certain events in a behavioral chain (i.e., a sequence of behaviors). For example,
given that the probability of completing later behaviors in the chain is increased
when the former behaviors are executed, the likelihood of leaving by 9 a.m. (the
final component) is high when the preparatory behaviors in the chain (e.g., awakening by 8 a.m.) are completed. Thus, a speaker may have a tendency to report an
intention to perform a later behavior in a behavioral chain when certain preparatory responses are made.
35. See B. F. SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM 55 (1974).
36. See, H. HART, supra note 11, at 3.
37. Commonwealth v. Carrol, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911, 917 (1963). See
generally Robbins, supra note 7.
38. See B. F. SKINNER, supra note 1, at 260.
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Because identification of prior intention is a prerequisite to
criminal liability, certain tests are applied by the courts to determine, to the greatest extent possible, the intention of the accused
at the time of committing the crime, and whether the accused intended to perform a further act beyond the scope of the criminal act
for which he was brought to trial. 9 Two major standards used to
determine mental state-the corroborative evidence and reasonable man tests4"-are based on the recognition of probable behavioral relations. Under the first standard, verbal reports are corroborated by the preponderance of supporting accumulated facts or evidence, a deductive process; the latter entails the construction of a
logical behavorial sequence by reference to common behavorial
tendencies, an inductive approach. The result of either test, however, is only as sound as the knowledge of the conditions that control
behavior and the probability of their occurrence. But despite differences in approach, both formulations deal with the behavior of the
"reasonable man". Accordingly, any determination of what the
accused actually intended to do is based on what ordinarily prudent people would do under the same circumstances.' The validity
of both tests is founded on the presumption that the actor intends
the natural consequences of his acts."2 What these natural consequences of an act are is a question for the trier-of-fact, which
usually is a jury.
If the jury is concerned with probability of fact-that is, when
a reasonable person should have foreseen the probable results of an
act and, therefore, be held accountable for those results-then there
is a danger of destroying the logical distinction between wanton
negligence and simple negligence. To elaborate, defendants are
found guilty of simple negligence if they are unable to foresee certain harmful consequences that a reasonable person would have
foreseen. This is the reasonable man test. For a defendant to be
found guilty of wanton negligence, proof of intentional conduct is
required. Following the logic set out above, if the consequences of
an act must be probable for a reasonable person to foresee them,
39. See KADISH, supra note 9, at 88-95; H. HART, supra note 11, at 117.
40. See, J. SALMOND, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 416 (8th ed. 1930). See also
KADISH, supra note 9, at 312.
41. See generally 0. HOLMES, supra note 12, at 3.
42. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (1953). Williams has
stated that "the expression 'natural' in law must mean probable; otherwise
'natural' would be meaningless." Id. at 77.
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failure to respond to probable consequences is either improbable or
intentional. Thus, while behavior that is undertaken despite knowledge of foreseeable harmful consequences clearly constitutes intentional criminal conduct or recklessness, failure to respond to probable consequences that are sufficiently perceptible to a reasonable
person, generally thought to constitute simple negligence, could also
be based on intent. If this is the case, then any distinction between
wanton negligence and simple negligence is suspect.
This argument can be answered in behavorial terms. Initially,
the conduct of the accused at the time of committing the act is not
the only evidence of his intention. Factors such as confessions, denials, demeanor in the witness box, and circumstantial evidence also
may be considered. 3 Moreover, a jury cannot conclusively state that
the accused actually foresaw the consequences of his action, no
matter how cognizable the probable consequences of the act are to
a reasonable person. Circumstances such as intoxication, insanity,
or infancy, for example, may negate such knowledge. In the latter
two cases, modern law neither expects nor requires the incompetent
to be knowledgeable of possible contingencies; thus it does not hold
him accountable for the harm resulting from such action."
The major problem with the reasonable man test is that standards of reasonable conduct become more difficult to recognize as
the number of deviations in behavior increases. To illustrate this
point, four depictions of the normal curve are presented in Table
Two.
TABLE TWO

__________________________________

J.

43. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 42. It is significant to note that all of these
related considerations are evaluations of the accused's behavior, rather than inferred mental states.
44. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 45-46 (1972).
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Assume that a poll on a given issue was administered to a hypothetical sample of the population, and that the responses were charted
on a distributional scale, or normal curve. 5 The "reasonable man"
45. An example of the type of questions, format of answering, and suggested
procedure for scoring appears in Appendix I. While the procedure is a useful de-
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might yield those scores that fall within some standard deviation
away from the highest point in the distribution (the place where the
greatest number of scores fell). Suppose further that the questions
on the poll provided any two elements of the behavorial paradigm-stimulus, response, and consequence-and required the interviewee to select the most appropriate third component from a list
of alternatives. If the purpose of the test was to determine the most
desirable consequence of a given behavior exhibited in the presence
of a given stimulus, a reasonable person would respond within a
certain range of deviations from the mode of the distribution-that
is, away from the consequence most frequently chosen by the sample population. When the curves are normally distributed, determination of the most common response can easily be made. The more
refined the delineation, the easier it becomes to determine whether
a single behavior falls within the area designated "reasonable". (Of
the normal curves shown in Table Two, "A" depicts the most narrow distribution of answers to the sample poll, and "D" represents
the widest variation of answers.) If the purpose of the test was to
determine the extent of negligence, a simple comparison of the consequence the accused thought would most probably result from a
given behavior with the consequence the sample chose as the most
probable would be sufficient. If the accused's choice was within the
"reasonable" area, he would not be found negligent. A label of
"recklessness" might be more appropriate, because intentional conduct would likely constitute the act, the results of which are to be
reasonably expected. If, however, the choice made by the accused
was outside the acceptable range, he would have been unaware of
the consequence of which a reasonable person would have been
aware.
When the bulk of the distribution of survey answers from a
given population is weighted at the mode-as in curve "A"-the
community allows for smaller deviations in behavior, and determiscriptive tool, it must have a comparable measure of community standards regarding the acceptability range of perceived reactions to each situation in order to judge
individual perceptions. The next step, then, would be to transform the questionnaire from a descriptive to an evaluative tool. See generallyJ. PIAGET, THE MORAL
JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1932); Keaser & Sales, The Empirical Investigation of
Young Children's Awareness and Usage of Intentionality in Criminal Situations, 1
LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR No. 1 (1977). Hypothetical situations, in which criminal
fault and damage resulted, were presented to children of varied ages. The children
were asked to assess the degree to which they though damage was intentionally
inflicted.
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nations of the reasonable person are easily made. In these cases,
specific consequences are almost certain to occur. If, however, the
most frequent choices in the survey are widely distributed-as in
curve "C"-the acceptable range allows for greater deviations in
behavior. In these cases, negligence is not as easily proven. When
the distribution is widely spread-as in curve "D"-there is no one
consequence that is considered most likely to occur. Such cases of
negligence may be brought before the courts more frequently, and
subsequent judicial decision making is more difficult. The same
difficulty in proving negligence exists when the behavior of the accused falls just outside the range for the reasonable man. Thus, the
reasonable man test is useful only when the modes are easily distinguishable-as in curves "A" and "B"-and the deviations are well
beyond the acceptable range from the mode.
Since reports of intention are actually statements of probability, one must confront the critical question of how probable the
results of a behavior must be before an individual is to be held
responsible for them. One plain answer is that the behavior must
be beyond an acceptable range of deviations from the mode."6 Of
46. One theme weaving throughout the entire discussion in this article is that
the means and methods of the social sciences can be useful to the law. See generally
Robbins, supra note 7. Clearly, however, quantification by some social-statistical
methodology is only one aspect of the question. The largest single part, for the legal
system, is the determination of the meaning of the quantification. That is to say,
a "fact" can never be "proven" scientifically. See, e.g., id. at 508-16. The best that
we can do is to test, by inductive reasoning, the "null hypothesis," in order to
attempt to reduce the limits of error. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28
n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1976); McGill v. United States, 348 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1965). A
particularly good example of this point in another context concerns the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of the criminal law. Suppose that
a woman's body is found in a ditch in an urban area. There is evidence
that the deceased had a violent quarrel with her boyfriend the night
before. He is known to have struck her on other occasions. Investigators
find the murder weapon, a knife which has on the handle a latent palm
print similar to the defendant's print. The information in the print is
limited so that [a fingerprint] expert can say only that such prints
appear in no more than one case in a thousand [in the general population].
Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to IdentificationEvidence, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 489, 496 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bayesian Approach]. Compare People
v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). The problem now
posed is whether the defendant is "guilty". At the risk of gross oversimplification,
assume that the combination of the evidence of the violent quarrel and the evidence
that the defendant had struck the decedent on other occasions produces x% proba-
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greater significance, however, is the fact that discriminations of
probability in a community occur within smaller ranges of deviation
from the mode-as in curve "A". If the acceptable range contains
nearly all of the scores on the distributional curve, a greater degree
of precision is required of the citizens. It is crucial in this type of
evaluation that the sample be representative of the population of
which the accused is a member, for since the jury is presumably
comprised of a group of one's peers, it should constitute a representative sample. In fact, selection of jury members might be made
according to responses to a questionnaire not unlike that in Appendix I. 41 Such a procedure might eliminate selection by attorneys on
the basis of superstition, which might be described as a form of
judicial administrative psychology.
One further issue should be addressed, though it is of doubtful
importance to a true understanding of the nature of intentional
action. Several scholars recently have alluded to two distinct forms
of intention, which presumably give rise to different legal consequences. The first kind of intention can be represented by an illustration. When one man kills another while driving at a high speed,
the law inquires whether the driver knew of the foreseeable dangers
that might result from his behavior, or, in other words, whether the
bility that the defendant killed her. Further assume that the addition of the onein-a-thousand evidence raises the probability to, say, 98.5%. The paramount question, for present purposes, then becomes whether that probability is "beyond a
reasonable doubt," or, to state it differently, whether reasonable doubt is greater
than a 1.5% risk of error in the decision of the trier-of-fact.
This question-like that of the requisite intent for criminal culpability-is a
legal, rather than a scientific, one. As such, "[wie must deal with the terminology
of law, not science." Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Great
flexibility is inherent in such a system, allowing the fact-finder to assess risks, to
measure probabilities,. and to make highly subjective judgments. While the sciences may help us to clarify and refine the concepts with which the law deals, the
ultimate determination, be it a fault or virtue of our system, is a legal one. Thus,
although there certainly are potential dangers of quantification, there can be great
advantages as well. CompareBayesian Approach, supra this note and Finkelstein
& Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics", 84 HAv. L. REV. 1801 (1971)
with Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HAv. L. REv. 1329 (1971) and Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof,
84 H~Av. L. REy. 1810 (1971). See generally A. MOENSSENS, R. MosEs & F. INBAU,
SciENiFic EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (1973). Fundamentally, then, the question
may be a serious one of attitude-on the one hand, optimism and the vision of a
dynamic legal system, or, on the other hand, pessimism and the acceptance of a
static one.
47. See note 45 supra.
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driver acted intentionally. If the accused responds that he was
aware of the foreseeable consequences but did not intend to harm
anyone-for example, in the same way that one who fires a gun at
point-blank range at a victim's head intends to inflict harm-the
law must determine whether "intentionally behaving" is equivalent
to "behaving intentionally."' In so doing, one must attempt to
distinguish between intention-as-behavorial-control and intentionas-goal-directed-behavior. 9 In the first case, the courts query
whether the accused was in control of his behavior and aware of its
foreseeable consequences; in the second, they rely heavily on the
probability that a reasonable man would order his behavior to
achieve a desired end. Although the distinction succeeds in calling
attention to various aspects of behavioral control, it is of limited
analytical utility for present purposes.
While academic disputes continue over how the law should
react to varied degrees of awareness and control of behavior, the
courts have developed a useful test for the classification of intentional crimes. Since choice among alternatives is necessary for deliberate action, intentional behavior requires preexisting reflection
or preconceived design, sometimes described as forethought.
This time component, for example, is critical to a finding of first
degree murder. 50 In addition, it suggests that variables external to
the accused may be reliable indicators of behavioral control.
The Supreme Court of California has devised a tripartite test
to evaluate behavioral episodes termed the "Premeditation and Deliberation Formula."'5 The components of this test are: (1) planning

(the conduct of a party prior to the commission of an illegal act that
shows that the party was engaged in activity directed toward, and
intended to result in, the act); (2) motive (facts about the defendant's prior relationship with the victim from which the jury can
infer a motive) and, (3) manner of commission of act (facts from
which the jury can infer that defendant acted according to a preconceived design). Inasmuch as the element of time theoretically is
48. See H. HART, supra note 11, at 117.
49. Bentham has called these concepts "oblique" and "direct" intention, respectively. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLE8 OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATIN 200-08. (1948) (1st ed. London 1823).
50. See, e.g., People v. Caldwell, 43 Cal. 2d 864, 869, 279 P. 2d 539, 542 (1955);
People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 900-901, 156 P. 2d 7, 18 (1945).
51. See People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 22, 447 P.2d 942, 949, 73 Cal. Rptr.
550 (1968).
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related to the possibility of choice, 52 the activities of the accused
prior to the commission of the illegal act might indicate the extent
to which he chose to behave as he did. These preliminary movements may be viewed as elements of planning, with degrees of criminal liability corresponding to the extent of planning activities over
time. Planning activities illustrative of the first component include
prior possession of the murder weapon,53 furtive pursuit,5 4 and careful concealment of the victim prior to actually committing the illegal act, in order to prevent interference. 5 Behaviorally speaking,
such planning steps may constitute early components of a behavioral chain, in which later components, such as the actual commission of the crime, are made more probable by response to discriminative stimuli in the behavioral chain. 6 This relationship is seen
more readily when the commission of a crime results from an extended planning effort. Hence, the difficulty of extricating oneself
from a complicated criminal plot may be one reason why the existence of extended planning activity is viewed by the courts as indicative of higher criminal culpability. 57
Apparently, courts are requiring less planning, over a shorter
period of time, before finding the first component of the premeditation formula. In several cases, careful preparation immediately prior
to commission of the act has been held to be sufficient for a finding
of first-degree murder." However, first-degree convictions are returned with much less difficulty when a period of cool reflection
weakens a defendant's claim of provocation. When planning over
time is not established, the courts must rely more heavily on the
other two components of the formula to affirm a finding of inten52. Behavior occurs linearly in time, so that as more time is observed, more
behavior is inferred, and vice versa.
53. See Belton v. United States, 382 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
54. See People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458, 359 P. 2d 913, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1961).
55. See People v. Hillary, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 401 P. 2d 382, 44 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1965).
56. See Commonwealth v. Carrol, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 (1963). In this
case, the testimony of several psychiatrists was a primary element in the defense.
The testimony of these expert witnesses was that if the gun had fallen to the floor
as the defendant reached for it on the windowsill, he would not have had the
homicidal capacity to pick it up and consummate the murder. Id. at 530, 194 A.2d
at 916.
57. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970).
58. See, e.g., People v. Hillary, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 401 P. 2d 382, 44 Cal. Rptr. 30
(1965); People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458, 359 P. 2d 913, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1961).
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tional homicide. 59

Facts about the defendant's prior relationship with the victim,
from which potential reinforcement contingencies can be perceived
by the jury, are collectively described as motive, the second component of the premeditation formula. Although it is said that the
relationship between defendant and deceased is an important element in arriving at inferential intention, it is in actuality the contingencies that are associated with that relationship that are critical."
For example, when one spouse murders the other in order to alleviate the emotional stress resulting from continued arguments, the
desire to escape from an aversive contingency positively reinforces
the homicidal behavior. 6 ' Similarly, when an individual murders a
person in order to receive insurance benefits, the effects of a positive
reinforcement contingency will likely establish "motive" or
"incentive" which, when combined with one of the other two components, may be sufficient to allow a jury to infer purposive behavior. Thus, motive is defined by the reinforcement contingencies that
may have controlled the behavior.
The third component of the premeditation and deliberation
formula relates to the manner of execution of the criminal
act-specifically whether the act was performed in such a precise
way as to indicate a preconceived design and, therefore, intentional
behavior. If a lethal knife wound is in a vital part of the body rather
than at random points, for example, a jury is likely to conclude that
the homicide was characterized by deliberate intention.' Typically,
first-degree murder convictions entail a combination of at least two
of the components discussed above, whereas lesser homicide convictions may be decided by only one component.
While this formula accounts for the three elements of a behavioral relation-stimulus (planning activity as part of a behavioral chain or sudden provocation), response (manner of killing),
and consequence (motive or reinforcing event contingent upon the
said activity)-its validity is still subject to the weaknesses inherent in the reasonable man test. For example, how much and what
kind of behavior is sufficient for the trier-of-fact to conclude that a
reasonable man would be planning an event? Similarly, how much
59.
(1968).
60.
61.
62.

See People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P. 2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550
See Goldiamond II, supra note 7, at 8.
See Commonwealth v. Carrol, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A. 2d 911 (1963).
See People v. Hillary, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 401 P. 2d 382, 44 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1965).
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provocation should a reasonable man be expected to endure, and for
how long, before he reacts to it? Would a reasonable man be able
to execute a crime so precisely if he had not intended to perform it?
Nevertheless, a standard for behavioral control that is based on an
examination of all three elements of the paradigm is a promising
evaluative device, and its perfection offers a stimulating challenge.
III.

Implications

As has been suggested, the major problem with the current
interpretation of legal intent is the general confusion within the
legal community regarding the nature and scope of the concept.
This confusion can be ascribed to its fundamental subjectivity and
to the courts' resultant discretionary approach to the issues involved. The by-products of this subjectivity may, in fact, limit the
consistency and efficacy of the judicial process.6 3 To formulate perimeters for this nonuniformity, practical analyses that can furnish
the means for innovative applications of the concept of intent are
required.
Sentencing guidelines provide an excellent example of how objectifying a traditionally discretionary procedure may enhance the
over-all consistency of adjudications. The principal contributions of
the guidelines are the identification of critical features of the offense
or offender, the weighing of them on a two-dimensional scale, and
the prediction of the appropriate sentences from numerical calculations."4 In other words, discretionary sentencing can be made an
objectifiable and predictable procedure, with the added benefit of
a reduction in court delay and backlog.
Legal intent can be analyzed in comparable pragmatic terms.
Perhaps by clarifying essential elements of the concept, moral and
procedural difficulties can be ameliorated, resulting in greater consistency and efficiency in legal adjudications. This article has laid
the foundation for such a practical approach to the concept of intent. It has identified significant behavioral components inherent in
the concept, and suggested, by example, a potential measurement
procedure to effectively predict and determine legal liability flowing
from given behaviors. The next stage in integrating these processes
63. H. HART, supra note 11, at 22 (justice is characterized by the expediency
and consistency of individual behavior for the mutual good of the individual and
the society). See Robbins, supra note 6.
64. See notes 20 & 21 supra and accompanying texts.
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is the derivation of empirical valuations for each component leading
to structured determinations of accountability.
IV.

Conclusion

Since the issue of legal intent involves a series of continua,
rather than dichotomies, it may be inappropriate to ask whether a
person behaved intentionally or unintentionally. Rather, the relevant inquiry might focus on the degree to which the actor was (1)
aware of his behavior (whether the actor would be able to state or
otherwise communicate what he is doing); (2) knowledgeable of the
consequences (whether a reasonable person would be able to estimate the probable outcome of a given behavior on a continuum of
normal curves for each crime and for the possible behavioral relations); and (3) in control of his or her behavior (whether there
were alternative reinforceable behaviors readily available). These
are the questions of legal intent, and the fact that triers-of-fact
are compelled to make discriminations among behaviors on the
basis of subjective, intuitive notions detracts from the consistency
5
and, perhaps, the integrity of the judicial system .
Although there is no reliable method of calculating and interpreting behaviors currently available, the variables that are necessary for a determination of intent can be identified. The popularity
of sentencing guidelines," for example, suggests that it is possible
to respond more consistently and perhaps more judiciously to traditionally unquantified variables. It is important to recognize that
such analyses are within reach, and can be the bases of an innovative approach to the concept of intent.
In order for the judicial process to analyze, evaluate, and predict man's behavior adequately, all three elements of the behavioral
paradigm-stimulus, response, and consequence-must be taken
into account. Indeed, the proper administration of justice cannot be
effected by a consideration of anything less. To this extent, a more
complete perspective of legal intent involves behavioral analysis,
and the future of the judicial system may depend, in large part, on
the general acceptance of this proposition.
65. Interestingly, it is logical that an analysis could be made to determine the
historical and environmental variables that control a judge's or juror's disposition
to react to a particular set of facts. See note 46 supra. See generally Robbins, supra
note 7.
66. See notes 20 & 64 supra and accompanying texts.
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APPENDIX I
SAMPLE POLL ESTIMATING THE RANGE OF THE
REASONABLE PERSON
KEY:

10
21
41
61

-

20
40
60
80

= never
sometimes
likely
always

=
=
=

DIRECTIONS: Answer the following questions by choosing how
probable it is that a particular result will occur. Specifically,
write in the space provided a number which corresponds with
a degree of likelihood listed in the key.
1. Given that the rate of traffic accidents reported in residential
suburban areas is highest when at least one of the automobiles
is traveling at a speed over 50 mph (defined as "high" residential speed), what is the probability that a car, driven at
a high speed in a residential area, will meet with an accident?
Answer:
2. Given that someone is lawfully fleeing from an assailant, who
he believes will harm him, and that the best available means
of eluding his pursurer is to drive faster than the pursuer
through streets closest to the driver (in this case, within a
residential area), what is the probability that the driver will
travel at a high speed in a residential area?
Answer:
3. Given the following circumstances:
a) Man, who had attained a high rank in the army, forced to
resign by demands of wife
b) Wife, who had been diagnosed as mentally ill, continually
beat and otherwise harmed their children
c) Wife argued violently about temporary employment assignment to another city
d) Psychiatrists later diagnosed husband as suffering from
extreme mental and emotional imbalance, which was accentuated by a long violent argument with wife, to the
point of acting impulsively and in desperation.
What is the probability that the husband would engage in
behavior that would extricate himself from his wife?
Answer:
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4. Given that the wife, in the above question, would not concede
to divorce what is the likelihood that the husband would act
violently towards her, most especially during the course of
a heated argument?
Answer:
(Interestingly, the facts in questions 3 and 4 above are taken
from Commonwealth v. Carrol, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
1963. In this case, the husband accused of murdering his wife,
pleaded that, due to provocation, he could not be liable for premeditated murder.)
Scoring
By first drawing an abscissa with points associated with the
available range of choices (such that a distributional scale is constructed), plot answers by all subjects on a scale for every question. For example, all scores for question 2 may be plotted on a
scale resembling the one below:
10
20
40
60
80
After placing scores above their designated values, a curve will
be formed, from which standard deviations may be calculated.
Once this is done, and after designations are made regarding the
number of deviations the public will allow, the "reasonable" area
for each question is comprised of only those scores which fall within the designated deviation. Thus, a range of acceptable or "reasonable" scores is objectively depicted, as well as a useful means for
evaluating potential juror's and the accused's responses.

